I am late to this, but thank you. Yes, the news is coming out rapidly. Success-story news about the JAL evacuation. And "what the hell???" news about the Coast Guard plane.
Most plausible hypotheses, in my judgment, are those involving fatigue-and-stress issues for the Coast Guard people, on emergency-relief duty after the earthquake.
Within the last 45 minutes, others are also reporting on the ATC transcripts. This is from CNN: Air traffic control gave the JAL passenger plane permission to land on Runway C at 5:43:26 p.m. local time (3:43:26 a.m. ET), according to the transcript. However, the transcript does not show clear takeoff approval for the coast guard aircraft, instead telling it to “taxi to holding point” at 5:45:11 p.m. (3:45:11 a.m. ET). The crew of the coast guard plane confirmed the instruction seconds later, according to the transcript. About 2 mins later, the 2 planes collided. Also, according to CNN, The flight recorders have been recovered from the CG plane, but not the JAL flight.
Thank you very much. Yes, the transcriptions so far are somewhat perplexing (instructions and responses that, at least in English, are "non-standard") but also clarifying. It does seem that, for whatever reason, the Coast Guard plane misunderstood its instructions.
A cautionary example for controllers and pilots around the world.
- Why was the Dash 8 given (and the pilot-in-command opted for) an intersection departure. While the Dash 8 is certainly capable of departing in half of the 9,840 feet that constitutes 34R, the safest option is to insist on a full-length departure. Nothing more useless than runway behind you, etc...
- How much of a factor was pilot fatigue, given that the crew was responding to a natural disaster with understandably heightened workload demands and pressure to "get the job done".
- The safe evacuation of everyone on the Japan Airlines flight recalls the 2 August 2005 crash of an Air France A340 that overran the runway at Toronto Pearson International Airport. In that case, too, all 309 on board escaped as flames enveloped the aircraft.
—Yes, agree about the general wisdom of avoiding intersection departures, despite the short takeoff distance for a Dash 8. I guess we'll learn more about their taxi route, what else was going on in their lives, etc.
—On the pilot-fatigue issue: My guess is that this will end up being the primary factor investigators concentrate on. A friend in Japan just wrote to say that, as she understood it, that crew had been on duty more or less nonstop since the earthquake, two days earlier. Certainly we'll hear more about this, but it had to be a major factor — combined with the sense of rescue-relief imperative.
What is also astonishing is the seeming normalcy on the tarmac after the initial impact. Worker continues to walk toward the building, with out turning. Presumably had hearing protection on. Plane continued to be backed out of its terminal position.
But what did surprise me, watching to the end was no appearance of flashing lights heading to the Dash 7. I don't think i messed them. Headed towards the Airbus?
Good point. Each of the observations you make is clear once I think about them, but I hadn't noticed them at first.
On the second point: from the videos it appears that the Coast Guard plane was basically eradicated by the initial impact — although, as we all know, the pilot initially survived. So maybe the rescue crews were going where most of the people were. I don't know.
"Perhaps future safety briefings need to be a lot more blunt:
'In Tokyo, everyone left their bags and stuff behind … and everyone got out alive.'"
Sobering and realistic: so much of the socials convo I have seen on this concludes that American pax would not all have survived, because some of them would have insisted on taking their luggage, and slowed egress to a fatal degree.
(I was backhandedly alluding to this in my China/Japan comparison. I have been on so many Chinese airline flights where half the passengers were standing in the aisles as the plane touched down, not wanting to lose any time.)
CNA - Channel News Asia - reports that the Minister of Transport told reporters that the Coast Guard plane was told to taxi and stop (hold short) at runway 34 and Flight 516 had been given clearance to land. https://youtu.be/sx_dGKmDOTI?si=1NOKSECzGqCVOuHj
I was greatly impressed by the rapidity with which the Japan Airways professionals emptied the burning plane before it exploded. There was a curious comment that this was possible with Japanese passengers, but less certain were they Chinese passengers, who might have been less obedient to follow orders to flee without hand baggage.
This becomes curious and curiouser—but kudos to no Japanese Airways deaths or injuries.
The crew of an arriving jet did not see an aircraft holding in position; its lights were lost among the bright approach and touchdown zone lights on the runway. The jet landed on top of the smaller turboprop.
The Haneda crash also recalls another near disaster at night at San Francisco involving Air Canada flight 759. In 2017. The landing jet confused the parallel taxiway with the runway. Only the urgent warning from the pilot of another airliner waiting to take off averted a terrible collision.
Bruce, thank you. And, yes, the SFO near-disaster comes to mind.
My guess has been that the Haneda actual-disaster was different from the averted-disaster at SFO partly because of the scale of the planes (a bunch of airliners in SFO, vs Dash 8 in Haneda); partly because there was a queue of waiting airliners at SFO; and partly because there was *more* traffic underway at SFO at that time, so more people participating in the watch-and-warn conversation.
I'm hardly an expert on airline operations at major airports. I see the SFO incident mostly as another example of how even well-trained, experienced pilots and air traffic controllers can fail to perceive a dangerous situation. And how easily even experienced pilots can be confused by lights and other visual cues in the crowded runway environment. Had the Air Canada crew been flying an approach in low IFR conditions (e.g., into SFO's famous fog), they would have focused on their instruments all the way to the runway. Sometimes good weather presents us with more difficult challenges than those associated with operations in low visibility.
It does sound very familiar. So many lessons to me:
1. Never sit on a runway (line up and wait) for very long—be absolutely paranoid about it after 15 seconds.
2. Check ADS-B traffic, even on the ground (the airplane on the runway can see the airplane inbound on final, and vice versa). On my Garmin, brown symbols for ground-based targets.
3. The US emphasis on explicit hold short instructions and mandatory read-backs of those instructions is occasionally verbose, but it works. I'm so glad the FAA changed this 10-15 years ago.
4. I always verbally confirm: gear down, cleared to land, runway clear. It can be hard to see at night with the bright lights, but sometimes verbalizing the "runway clear" part makes me look a little harder.
John, thank you. Agree with all of those. And agree about using every *possible* source of info about other traffic. For me that has meant: three screens in the airplane itself (Avidyne MFD, plus IFD 550 and 440); one iPad (with Stratus input of ADS-B info); and relentless/obsessive looks from every angle of the cockpit. I've never come close to a "separation" problem on takeoff or while taxiing, but I worry about it each time.
I'm with you, John. My taxi-out and before takeoff routines now include displaying the ADS-B traffic page on my GTN 750 and double-checking for traffic on the iPad. This procedure is especially important when departing a non-towered airport. Inbound traffic flying approaches may not yet be on the CTAF. ADS-B doesn't replace a vigilant lookout, but it can be an valuable complement.
Thanks, Jim, and to your fellow aviators for all the rich information about the tragedy and the larger as well as more technical if general issues it illuminates.
I decided to respond here because I was planning on a non-pilot question regarding ADS-B because my experience designing transportation control room workstation environments in the 80's and 90's made me wonder why modern avionics as well as ATC environments does not include a view of all these transponders with some form of proximity warning directly to pilots.
That said, nothing is a total substitution for best practices that include attentiveness for the unusual and unexpected. I wonder, in fact, whether reliance on ILS without heightened attention to that which it does not manage is a lacune in the training of modern airline pilots even if those flying the Airbus in this accident were not directly responsible for the creation of this catastrophic situation.
Most smaller, general-aviation aircraft are now equipped with ADS-B systems that transmit their positions and which can also display nearby aircraft (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic_Dependent_Surveillance%E2%80%93Broadcast) on a screen in the cockpit. Often these displays include a trend vector that shows the paths of nearby aircraft and their altitude relative to you.
Thank you, Bruce. That's exactly what I thought without knowing all the system names. It still seems that an automated equivalent to the ground proximity warning annunciator does not exist for the crew of large transport aircraft whether or not the ILS is active. All the information would seem to be present for an autonomous monitor of this sort. Perhaps there are factors that are not obvious, but it seems obvious the pilot of the Airbus would have immediately and unilaterally aborted the landing if alerted early enough.
There's a good article about the evacuation of the Japan Airlines plane at https://www.wsj.com/business/airlines/inside-a-flaming-jet-367-passengers-had-minutes-to-flee-heres-how-they-did-it-f0e3c2dc or on Apple News+ at https://apple.news/AI5vbKsdmTXiWSHz4PeGAGg
I am late to this, but thank you. Yes, the news is coming out rapidly. Success-story news about the JAL evacuation. And "what the hell???" news about the Coast Guard plane.
Most plausible hypotheses, in my judgment, are those involving fatigue-and-stress issues for the Coast Guard people, on emergency-relief duty after the earthquake.
Within the last 45 minutes, others are also reporting on the ATC transcripts. This is from CNN: Air traffic control gave the JAL passenger plane permission to land on Runway C at 5:43:26 p.m. local time (3:43:26 a.m. ET), according to the transcript. However, the transcript does not show clear takeoff approval for the coast guard aircraft, instead telling it to “taxi to holding point” at 5:45:11 p.m. (3:45:11 a.m. ET). The crew of the coast guard plane confirmed the instruction seconds later, according to the transcript. About 2 mins later, the 2 planes collided. Also, according to CNN, The flight recorders have been recovered from the CG plane, but not the JAL flight.
Thank you very much. Yes, the transcriptions so far are somewhat perplexing (instructions and responses that, at least in English, are "non-standard") but also clarifying. It does seem that, for whatever reason, the Coast Guard plane misunderstood its instructions.
A cautionary example for controllers and pilots around the world.
Some thoughts that come to my pilot's mind:
- Why was the Dash 8 given (and the pilot-in-command opted for) an intersection departure. While the Dash 8 is certainly capable of departing in half of the 9,840 feet that constitutes 34R, the safest option is to insist on a full-length departure. Nothing more useless than runway behind you, etc...
- How much of a factor was pilot fatigue, given that the crew was responding to a natural disaster with understandably heightened workload demands and pressure to "get the job done".
- The safe evacuation of everyone on the Japan Airlines flight recalls the 2 August 2005 crash of an Air France A340 that overran the runway at Toronto Pearson International Airport. In that case, too, all 309 on board escaped as flames enveloped the aircraft.
Thanks very much, and replying belatedly:
—Yes, agree about the general wisdom of avoiding intersection departures, despite the short takeoff distance for a Dash 8. I guess we'll learn more about their taxi route, what else was going on in their lives, etc.
—On the pilot-fatigue issue: My guess is that this will end up being the primary factor investigators concentrate on. A friend in Japan just wrote to say that, as she understood it, that crew had been on duty more or less nonstop since the earthquake, two days earlier. Certainly we'll hear more about this, but it had to be a major factor — combined with the sense of rescue-relief imperative.
What is also astonishing is the seeming normalcy on the tarmac after the initial impact. Worker continues to walk toward the building, with out turning. Presumably had hearing protection on. Plane continued to be backed out of its terminal position.
But what did surprise me, watching to the end was no appearance of flashing lights heading to the Dash 7. I don't think i messed them. Headed towards the Airbus?
Good point. Each of the observations you make is clear once I think about them, but I hadn't noticed them at first.
On the second point: from the videos it appears that the Coast Guard plane was basically eradicated by the initial impact — although, as we all know, the pilot initially survived. So maybe the rescue crews were going where most of the people were. I don't know.
"Perhaps future safety briefings need to be a lot more blunt:
'In Tokyo, everyone left their bags and stuff behind … and everyone got out alive.'"
Sobering and realistic: so much of the socials convo I have seen on this concludes that American pax would not all have survived, because some of them would have insisted on taking their luggage, and slowed egress to a fatal degree.
Unfortunately I think you are right.
(I was backhandedly alluding to this in my China/Japan comparison. I have been on so many Chinese airline flights where half the passengers were standing in the aisles as the plane touched down, not wanting to lose any time.)
CNA - Channel News Asia - reports that the Minister of Transport told reporters that the Coast Guard plane was told to taxi and stop (hold short) at runway 34 and Flight 516 had been given clearance to land. https://youtu.be/sx_dGKmDOTI?si=1NOKSECzGqCVOuHj
Thank you!
Jim Again warm thanks for your expertise.!
I was greatly impressed by the rapidity with which the Japan Airways professionals emptied the burning plane before it exploded. There was a curious comment that this was possible with Japanese passengers, but less certain were they Chinese passengers, who might have been less obedient to follow orders to flee without hand baggage.
This becomes curious and curiouser—but kudos to no Japanese Airways deaths or injuries.
As more details emerge, this crash seems similar to a deadly 1991 collision on a runway at KLAX: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disaster
The crew of an arriving jet did not see an aircraft holding in position; its lights were lost among the bright approach and touchdown zone lights on the runway. The jet landed on top of the smaller turboprop.
The Haneda crash also recalls another near disaster at night at San Francisco involving Air Canada flight 759. In 2017. The landing jet confused the parallel taxiway with the runway. Only the urgent warning from the pilot of another airliner waiting to take off averted a terrible collision.
Bruce, thank you. And, yes, the SFO near-disaster comes to mind.
My guess has been that the Haneda actual-disaster was different from the averted-disaster at SFO partly because of the scale of the planes (a bunch of airliners in SFO, vs Dash 8 in Haneda); partly because there was a queue of waiting airliners at SFO; and partly because there was *more* traffic underway at SFO at that time, so more people participating in the watch-and-warn conversation.
What is your more expert view?
I'm hardly an expert on airline operations at major airports. I see the SFO incident mostly as another example of how even well-trained, experienced pilots and air traffic controllers can fail to perceive a dangerous situation. And how easily even experienced pilots can be confused by lights and other visual cues in the crowded runway environment. Had the Air Canada crew been flying an approach in low IFR conditions (e.g., into SFO's famous fog), they would have focused on their instruments all the way to the runway. Sometimes good weather presents us with more difficult challenges than those associated with operations in low visibility.
It does sound very familiar. So many lessons to me:
1. Never sit on a runway (line up and wait) for very long—be absolutely paranoid about it after 15 seconds.
2. Check ADS-B traffic, even on the ground (the airplane on the runway can see the airplane inbound on final, and vice versa). On my Garmin, brown symbols for ground-based targets.
3. The US emphasis on explicit hold short instructions and mandatory read-backs of those instructions is occasionally verbose, but it works. I'm so glad the FAA changed this 10-15 years ago.
4. I always verbally confirm: gear down, cleared to land, runway clear. It can be hard to see at night with the bright lights, but sometimes verbalizing the "runway clear" part makes me look a little harder.
John, thank you. Agree with all of those. And agree about using every *possible* source of info about other traffic. For me that has meant: three screens in the airplane itself (Avidyne MFD, plus IFD 550 and 440); one iPad (with Stratus input of ADS-B info); and relentless/obsessive looks from every angle of the cockpit. I've never come close to a "separation" problem on takeoff or while taxiing, but I worry about it each time.
Notable that (apparently) the Dash 8 here was not ADS-B Out equipped.
I'm with you, John. My taxi-out and before takeoff routines now include displaying the ADS-B traffic page on my GTN 750 and double-checking for traffic on the iPad. This procedure is especially important when departing a non-towered airport. Inbound traffic flying approaches may not yet be on the CTAF. ADS-B doesn't replace a vigilant lookout, but it can be an valuable complement.
Thanks, Jim, and to your fellow aviators for all the rich information about the tragedy and the larger as well as more technical if general issues it illuminates.
I decided to respond here because I was planning on a non-pilot question regarding ADS-B because my experience designing transportation control room workstation environments in the 80's and 90's made me wonder why modern avionics as well as ATC environments does not include a view of all these transponders with some form of proximity warning directly to pilots.
That said, nothing is a total substitution for best practices that include attentiveness for the unusual and unexpected. I wonder, in fact, whether reliance on ILS without heightened attention to that which it does not manage is a lacune in the training of modern airline pilots even if those flying the Airbus in this accident were not directly responsible for the creation of this catastrophic situation.
Bruce, Ed — thanks for the colloquy that follows.
Airliners have a system called TCAS (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Traffic_collision_avoidance_system) that displays conflicts and also provides cues (climb, turn, descend, etc.) to both aircraft that are getting too close. Major airports have a related system, Airport Movement Area Safety System (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airport_surveillance_and_broadcast_systems#ASDE-X) that detects aircraft on runways and taxiways and alerts air traffic controllers to conflicts.
Most smaller, general-aviation aircraft are now equipped with ADS-B systems that transmit their positions and which can also display nearby aircraft (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic_Dependent_Surveillance%E2%80%93Broadcast) on a screen in the cockpit. Often these displays include a trend vector that shows the paths of nearby aircraft and their altitude relative to you.
Thank you, Bruce. That's exactly what I thought without knowing all the system names. It still seems that an automated equivalent to the ground proximity warning annunciator does not exist for the crew of large transport aircraft whether or not the ILS is active. All the information would seem to be present for an autonomous monitor of this sort. Perhaps there are factors that are not obvious, but it seems obvious the pilot of the Airbus would have immediately and unilaterally aborted the landing if alerted early enough.